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CRYPTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE MODIFIED
MATRIX MODULAR CRYPTOSYSTEM
VITALI˘I ROMAN’KOV
Abstract. We show that the Modified Matrix Modular Cryptosystem
proposed by S.K. Rososhek is not secure against the attack based on the
linear decomposition method. The security of the encryption scheme in
the Rososheks system is based on the mix of the conjugacy search prob-
lem and random ”salt”. We do not solve the conjugacy search problem
and we are not looking for the exact meaning of the ”salt”. The trans-
ported secret message in the system is recovered without computation
the secret parameters, that have been used for its encryption.
1. Introduction
The Basic Matrix Modular Cryptosystem (BMMC) is a public key cryp-
tosystem, which was proposed by S.K. Rososhek in [1]. Protocol using
BMMC was developed for the key exchange in [2]. BMMC realization needs
three matrix modular exponentiations for key generation, three exponentia-
tions under encryption and two exponentiations under decryption for every
data block.
In [3], Rososhek proposed two different modifications of BMMC. We con-
sider them as two versions of the Modified Matrix Modular Cryptosystem
(MMMC). The aim of [3] was to decrease the number of exponentiations
and consequently to accelerate the execution of encryption algorithm. The
author of [3] proposed to determine the large abelian subgroup in general
linear group over the large residue ring and to choose the session keys in
this subgroup, what will be to give the encryption without exponentiations.
Below we consider one of the main protocols, proposed in [3].
In this paper, we show that MMMC is vulnerable against the attack based
on the linear decomposition method invented by the author in monograph [4]
and papers [5], [6] with A. Myasnikov (see also monograph [7]) and developed
by the author et al. in the papers [8] - [11]. In this paper, we describe the
attack to MMMC in general case and illustrate the efficiently of this attack
on the example of the numerical realization of MMMC proposed by Rososhek
in [3]. The security of the encryption scheme in the Rososheks system is
based on the mix of the conjugacy search problem and random ”salt”. We do
not solve the conjugacy search problem and we do not seek exact value of the
”salt”. The transported secret message is recovered without computation
the secret parameters, that have been used for its encryption.
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In [4] (see also [5], [6] or [7]), we have shown that in many systems and
schemes of the algebraic cryptography, where the platform group G is a sub-
set of a linear space, we can efficiently compute the secret message or shared
key and hence to compromise the corresponding cryptographic system. We
elaborated a method, that is called the linear decomposition method. In
some points this method is similar to the Tsaban’s span method (see [12]).
The linear decomposition method can be applied if the platform is part of
a finite dimensional linear space V over a field F, or (in the modified form) a
finite generated module M over a commutative ring K. In the applications
of this method we construct a basis of the corresponding subspace W . In
fact, we don’t need in a basis. It is sufficient to take a linear generating set
for W . It is well known that if F is a finite field of order q and dim(W )
= n, where n is very small with respect to q, then n random vectors of
W generate W with high probability. More precisely, let F be a finite field
Fq, q = p
r, p - prime, of order q. Then there are exactly qn different n-vectors
over F. Suppose that we take vectors in random via the uniform distribution
on W . Let we choose n random vectors in W in sequence. We compute a
probability to choose n linearly independent vectors. The first of them is
nontrivial with the probability g
n
−1
qn
. The second is independent with first
with probability q
n
−q
qn
, and so on till q
n
−qn−1
qn
. Hence this probability is
n−1∏
i=0
qn − qi
qn
> (1− 1/q)n > 1− n/q.
If we know thatW has a dimension less than n the corresponding probability
to choose n random elements that generate W is obviously greater than
1− n/q.
Thus, we can choose randomly elements w1, ..., wn inW and try to present
the given element w ∈ W as a linear combination of these elements. We
can take more than n elements to increase the mentioned probability. Sure,
we need to determine what is ”random” in each specific case. Sometimes
we can use this approach for modules. Below we’ll give the corresponding
example.
Some proposed cryptographic schemes are such that a linear generating
set for W can be easily extracted from the scheme setting. For example, a
commutative subsemigroup G of Mn(Z) can be proposed as follows. Fix a
matrix a ∈Mn(Z), and defineG := Z[a] := {p(a) : p(t) ∈ Z[t]}.With respect
to matrix multiplication G has the structure of abelian semigroup. Then Al-
ice chooses a matrix g ∈ Z[a] and sends to Bob vector hg, where h ∈ H is
the chosen vector of the protocol. Bob acts in the similar way. In the crypt-
analysis we need to construct a linear generating set for some linear space
of the form vG = {vg : g ∈ G} where v ∈ H. Then in view of the Cayley-
Hamilton theorem, the space vG is generated by vectors v, va, va2, ..., van−1.
In a similar two-sided version where v is a n × n-matrix with rows in H,
there is a generating set {aivaj : i, j = 0, ...n − 1}.
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2. Description of MMMC
As usual we suppose, that there are two correspondents, Alice and Bob,
and that they use a non-secure net for their communications. A potential
intruder, Eve, can read all their messages.
In [3], Rososhek proposed a cryptographic scheme and considered its a
numerical variant. We’ll analyze the scheme and this variant and show
how the shared common key can be efficiently computed without the secret
parameters that has been used for the encryption.
Assumptions. Alice doing the following:
(1) picks a pair of random prime numbers q 6= p and computes n = pq,
then she determines Zn;
(2) takes the obviously abelian subgroup G = {
(
g f
f g
)
: g, f ∈ Zn
and g2 − f2 = 1};
(3) picks four random integers a, b, c, d ∈ Zn such that a
2 − b2 = 1 and
c2 − d2 = 1;
(4) composes two random matrices:
(1) V =
(
a b
b a
)
∈ G and W =
(
c d
d c
)
∈ G;
(5) Alice defines two commuting inner automorphisms of the ring M2(Zn):
α : D 7→ V −1DV, β : D 7→W−1DW for every matrix D ∈ M2(Zn).
(6) Alice computes the following automorphisms of the ring M2(Zn):
ψ = α2β, ϕ = αβ2.
(7) Alice picks a random invertible matrix L ∈ GL2(Zn) such that L
does not belong to the subgroup G.
(8) Alice public key is (n,ϕ(L), ψ(L−1)), private key is (V,W ).
Algorithm. Bob doing the following:
(1) presents the plaintext m as a sequence of 2×2-matrices over residue
ring Zn:
m1||m2||...||mn;
(2) for every mi, i = 1, 2, ..., n, chooses a random matrix Yi ∈ G;
(3) defines for every i = 1, 2, ..., n, the automorphisms
ξi : D 7→ Y
−1
i DYi for every D ∈ M2(Zn);
(4) computes for every i = 1, 2, ..., n matrices
ξi(ϕ(L)), ξi(ψ(L
−1)),miξi(ϕ(L));
(5) picks for every i = 1, 2, ..., n random units γi ∈ Z
∗
n (”salt”) and
computes the ciphertext:
C = (C(1)||C(2)||...||C(n)), C(i) = (C
(i)
1 , C
(i)
2 ),
where C
(i)
1 = γ
−1
i ξi(ψ(L
−1)), C
(i)
2 = γimiξi(ϕ(L)), i = 1, 2, ..., n.
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Decryption. Alice doing the following:
(1) computes for every i = 1, 2, ..., n, using her private key:
Di = α
−1(β(C
(i)
1 )) = α
−1(β(γ−1i ξi(ψ(L
−1))));
(2) computes for every i = 1, 2, ..., n matrices:
C
(i)
2 Di = γimiξi(ϕ(L))Di = mi;
(3) restores the plaintext m from the matrix sequence m1,m2, ...,mn.
3. Cryptanalysis.
We are going to show that every mi can be recovered by any intruder that
based only on the public data. It is sufficient to show how we can recover
one of the blocks mi. Denote m = mi, C1 = C
(i)
1 , C2 = C
(i)
2 , ξ = ξi, γ =
γi, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Everybody can see the following data:
n,ϕ(L), ψ(L−1)(and so ϕ(L−1), ψ(L)), C1 = γ
−1ξ(ψ(L−1)), C2 = γmξ(ϕ(L)).
It is sufficient to compute γ−1ξ(ϕ(L−1)) (to swap ψ to ϕ in C1).
Let G˜ denotes the abelian subgoup of GL2(Zn) consisting of all matrices
of the form
(
a b
b a
)
where a2 − b2 is invertible in Zn. Let W be the set
of all linear combinations of all matrices of the form ζ(ψ(L−1)), in M2(Zn),
where ζ is a conjugation by a matrix in G˜.
We claim that there exists a set ζ1(ψ(L
−1)), ..., ζk(ψ(L
−1)), ζi ∈ G˜, i =
1, 2, ..., k; k ≤ 4, for which every matrix in W is a linear combination of
these matrices over Zn. Below we’ll explain this assertion.
For a ring R and an R-moduleM , the set E ⊆M is a basis forM if: E is
a generating set for M that is to say, every element of M is a finite sum of
elements of E multiplied by coefficients in R, and E is linearly independent,
that is, α1e1+ ...+αkek = 0 for e1, ..., ek distinct elements of E implies that
α1 = ... = αk = 0. A free module is a module with a basis. But not each
module has a basis.
For any submodule V of the free module Zrn, where r ∈ N and n = pq,
as above, we define a notion of a quasi-basis as a minimal subset E of V
such that every element of V is a finite sum of elements of E multiplied by
coefficients in Zn. Now we prove that V has a quasi-basis consisting of ≤ r
elements and show how such quasi-basis can be obtained.
Let Vp be the p-image of V , i.e., a homomorphic image of V modulo p
and Vq is the q-image of V modulo q. Then Vp is a linear space over Zp,
and Vq is a linear space over Zq. Let a1, ..., ak be a basis of Vp and b1, ..., bl
be a basis of Vq. Since Vp and Vq are subspaces of Z
r
p and Z
r
q respectively,
k, l ≤ r. Suppose that k ≥ l. If k 6= l we add to the set b1, ..., bl k − l zero
elements and get b1, ..., bk. We can consider elements ai and bj as r-tuples of
components a
(j)
i and b
(j)
i that are written as integers. Then by the Chinese
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remainder theorem we can find e
(j)
i ∈ N such that e
(j)
i = a
(j)
i (mod p) and
e
(j)
i = b
(j)
i (mod q), respectively. We do it for all i and j. As result we have
a quasi-basis E = {e1, ..., ek}. Indeed, two the images vp ∈ Vp and vq ∈ Vq
of an arbitrary element v ∈ V have two presentations:
vp =
k∑
i=1
αiei and vq =
k∑
i=1
βiei, respectively,
where all coefficients are written as natural numbers. Again, by the Chinese
remainder theorem we can find γi such that γi = αi(mod p) and γi =
βi(mod q) for each i = 1, ..., k. Then
v =
k∑
i=1
γiei
is a presentation of v as a linear combination of vectors of E over Zn. Ob-
viously the size k is minimal for a generating set, thus E is quasi-basis.
The just described algorithm can be applied only in the case when p and q
are known. In other case we only know that there is a quasi-basis consisting
of k ≤ r elements.
Now we return to the considering protocol. We have M2(Zn) that is a free
Zn-module of dimension 4, and its submodule W. We have just proved that
there is a quasi-basis {ζ1(ψ(L
−1)), ..., ζk(ψ(L
−1)), ζi ∈ G˜, i = 1, 2, ..., k; k ≤
4} of W . We need not exactly in quasi-basis but in some generating set. A
set of four such elements chosen by the random process via uniform distri-
bution generates W if and only if it generates W modulo p and q simulta-
neously. The corresponding probabilities for n < p, q (as it has been showed
above) exceed 1 − n/p and 1 − n/q respectively. It follows that the prob-
ability to generate W exceeds (1 − n/p)(1 − n/q). Suppose that we find a
generating set {ζ1(ψ(L
−1)), ..., ζ4(ψ(L
−1)), ζi ∈ G˜, i = 1, ..., 4} of W .
Then we compute a presentation of the form
(2) ϕ(L−1) =
4∑
i=1
αiζi(ψ(L
−1)), αi ∈ Zn.
Then we change in the right hand side of (2) ψ(L−1) by C1:
(3)
4∑
i=1
αiζi(C1) = γ
−1ξ(
4∑
i=1
αiζi(ψ(L
−1)) = γ−1ξ(ϕ(L−1)).
Now we recover the message as
(4) C2γ
−1ξ(ϕ(L−1)) = m.
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4. Example
Now we consider the numerical Example 1 in [3] and give a cryptanalysis.
Assumptions.
Alice doing the following:
(1) picks the primes p = 5, q = 7 and computes n = pq = 35;
(2) chooses four random integers in the modular ring Z35: 7, 4, 6, 2;
(3) composes the random matrices
V =
(
7 4
4 7
)
,W =
(
6 2
2 6
)
;
(4) computes det(V ) = 33, det(W ) = 32 and then computes det(V )−1
= 17, det(W )−1=23. therefore V andW are units in the matrix ring
M2(Z35);
(5) defines two automorphisms of the ring M2(Z35):
α : D 7→ V −1DV, β : D 7→W−1DW
for every matrix D ∈ M2(Z35);
(6) computes the following automorphisms :
ψ = α2β, ϕ = αβ2;
(7) chooses the random matrix L ∈ GL2(Z35):
L =
(
1 2
3 5
)
and computes matrix
L−1 =
(
30 2
3 34
)
;
(8) computes matrices:
ϕ(L) = (V W 2)−1L(V W 2) =
(
34 34
6 7
)
,
ψ(L−1) = (V 2W )−1L−1(V 2W ) =
(
23 24
16 6
)
;
(9) Alice public key is
(n = 35, ϕ(L) =
(
34 34
6 7
)
, ψ(L−1) =
(
23 24
16 6
)
),
private key is
(V =
(
7 4
4 7
)
,W =
(
6 2
2 6
)
).
Algorithm.
Bob doing the following:
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(1) presents the plaintext as a matrix
m =
(
11 2
9 3
)
∈ M2(Z35);
(2) picks the random matrix
Y =
(
3 5
5 3
)
∈ G
and computes
Y −1 =
(
2 20
20 2
)
;
defines automorphism ξ of the ring M2(Z35):
ξ : D 7→ Y −1DY
for every D ∈ M2(Z35);
(3) computes matrices:
ξ(ϕ(L)) = Y −1(ϕ(L))Y =
(
29 24
16 12
)
,
ξ(ψ(L−1)) = Y −1(ψ(L−1))Y =
(
13 24
16 16
)
;
(4) picks random unit
γ ∈ Z35, γ = 9, γ
−1 = 4;
(5) computes the ciphertext C = (C1, C2) :
C1 = γ
−1ξ(ψ(L−1)) =
(
17 26
29 29
)
,
C2 = γmξ(ϕ(L)) =
(
9 2
16 28
)
.
Decryption.
Alice doing the following:
(1) computes matrix z, using her private key:
z = α−1β(C1) =
(
22 26
29 24
)
;
(2) computes then
C2z =
(
11 2
9 3
)
= m.
Cryptanalysis. Firstly we compute
ϕ(L−1) = (ϕ(L))−1 =
(
28 34
6 1
)
.
By the way we can compute (γ−1)2. Indeed, det(ψ(L−1)) = 34, det(C1) =
det(ψ(L−1)) = 19, then (γ−1)2 = 16.
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We choose four ”random” matrices of the form ζ(ψ(L−1)), where ζ ∈ G˜
(in fact four matrices with simplest conjugators):
e1 = ψ(L
−1) =
(
23 24
16 6
)
,
e2 = (−1)
(
0 34
34 0
)(
23 24
16 6
)(
0 1
1 0
)
=
(
6 16
24 23
)
,
e3 = 12
(
2 1
1 2
)(
23 24
16 6
)(
2 34
34 2
)
=
(
0 27
13 29
)
,
(5) e4 = 23
(
1 2
2 1
)(
23 24
16 6
)(
1 33
33 1
)
=
(
29 13
27 0
)
.
Then we are to solve the equation
ϕ(L−1) =
4∑
i=1
αiei,
namely: (
28 34
6 1
)
= α1
(
23 24
16 6
)
+ α2
(
6 16
24 23
)
+
α3
(
0 27
13 29
)
+ α4
(
29 13
27 0
)
.
By direct computation via the Gauss elimination process we obtain the
unique solution:
α1 = 7, α2 = 0, α3 = 1, α4 = 28.
We have (
28 34
6 1
)
= 7
(
23 24
16 6
)
+
12
(
2 1
1 2
)(
23 24
16 6
)(
2 34
34 2
)
+
14
(
1 2
2 1
)(
23 24
16 6
)(
1 33
33 1
)
.
Then we swap
ψ(L−1) =
(
23 24
16 6
)
in the right hand side of the last equality with
C1 =
(
17 26
29 29
)
and compute
7
(
17 26
29 29
)
+ 12
(
2 1
1 2
)(
17 26
29 29
)(
2 34
34 2
)
+
14
(
1 2
2 1
)(
17 26
29 29
)(
1 33
33 1
)
=
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(
14 7
28 28
)
+
(
15 33
22 31
)
+
(
28 21
14 0
)
=
(
22 26
29 24
)
.
At last we multiply C2 to the just computed matrix:(
9 2
16 28
)(
22 26
29 24
)
=
(
11 2
9 3
)
= m,
and we succeeded.
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